A unified analysis of executive pay: the case of the banking industry by Gregory E. Sierra et al.
 






A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay: 
The Case of the Banking Industry 
Gregory E. Sierra 








James S. Wallace 















The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
SUPERVISORY POLICY ANALYSIS WORKING PAPER 
Working Paper 2004-02 
 
 
A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay: 











London Business School and University of California, Irvine 
 
James S. Wallace (contact author) 









Peter F Drucker School of Management, Claremont Graduate University, 1021 N. Dartmouth 
Ave., Claremont, CA. 91711 Telephones: (909) 607-6063 (Wallace) (314) 444-4644 (Sierra) 
+44(0)20 7262 5050 (Talmor in London) and Fax: (949) 725-2852 (Wallace).  E-mails: 
james.Wallace@cgu.edu  Gregory.E.Sierra@stls.frb.org and etalmor@london.edu  
 
* We are thankful to Kuntara Pukthuanthong for capable research assistance and to Tom King, Robert 
Litzenberger, Gilad Livne, Dennis Oswald, Laura Starks, Asher Tishler and Robert Town for valuable 
suggestions.  We are also grateful to seminar participants at the London Business School, London School 
of Economics, University of Chicago, University of Colorado-Boulder, University of Exeter, Hebrew 
University, Southern Methodist University, and Claremont McKenna College for helpful comments.   
A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay: 







This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. banking industry.   
Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous 
sample.  We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the 
companies selected.  We explore the simultaneous relationship between compensation, firm 
performance, and board strength, exploiting variables unique to the banking industry.  Our 
primary finding is that after controlling for both regulatory oversight and external market 
discipline, a strong board is associated with higher firm performance and lower levels of 
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A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay: 
The Case of the Banking Industry 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
The structure of executive compensation has been subjected to extensive academic 
research in almost all fields of management.  It involves issues ranging from labor economics 
and industrial organization, to accounting, finance, law, organization behavior and strategic 
management.
1  As a consequence, numerous theories have been advanced with each providing 
another aspect of the puzzle.  The purpose of the current study is to consider many of these 
factors in a unified test.  In doing so, we augment the compensation analysis with an in-depth 
look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies selected.  We choose 
to focus the study on the banking industry.  Banks are relatively homogenous in many of their 
operational characteristics, thereby allowing for a reasonable control of unspecified factors.   
Within the sector, we distinguish between various levels of internal, external market and 
regulatory monitoring, thereby allowing for testing hypotheses of executive compensation in the 
presence of multiple governance and monitoring mechanisms. 
  Executive compensation in banks has been examined in several previous studies.  Barro 
and Barro (1990) analyze the pay-for-performance relation for a sample of large commercial 
banks.  They show compensation to be affected by firm performance, and that the sensitivity of 
the relation diminishes with the experience of the CEO.  Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995) and 
Hubbard and Palia (1995) each test for the effect of bank regulatory changes on the pay-
performance relation.  Both studies confirm executive pay sensitivity increases during the 1980s 
following deregulation of commercial banks (e.g., the 1980 Depository Institution Deregulation   2  
and Monetary Control Act and legislation by nearly all states to allow interstate banking).   
Houston and James (1995) examine whether the form of compensation contracts in commercial 
banks promotes more risk taking.  The authors find lower use of stock-based compensation in 
banks than in other industries.  They interpret this evidence as being consistent with contracting 
theory but inconsistent with the incentive for increased risk taking resulting from depository 
insurance.
2  For a sample of saving and loan institutions, Hermalin and Wallace (2001) show that 
allowing heterogeneity in the model specification results in a stronger correlation between firm 
performance on managerial compensation than that found in previous studies (notably, Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990).  These studies are only concerned with the pay-performance relation in 
depository institutions.  Fields and Fraser (1999) examine the pay-performance in bank holding 
companies with securities activities around their introduction period and compare it to a handful 
sample of investment banks. 
  Our study departs from the previous literature in several ways.  First, our study includes 
additional variables beyond firm structure and performance in order to accommodate 
complementing theories of pay determination that have been advanced in the economic and 
business strategy literatures.  In particular, we examine in detail the corporate governance 
structure (e.g., board characteristics) of the financial institutions in the sample and consider their 
contracting implications.  Second, we look at the effect of CEO ownership on executive 
compensation and extend much of the previous literature by considering the incentive effects of 
not only direct share ownership, but also of CEO option holdings.  Third, we exploit the unique 
                                                                                                                                                               
1 Research on executive compensation can be traced back as far as Taussig and Barker (1925).  For a review of the 
literature, see Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Murphy (1999). 
2 John, Saunders and Senbet (2000) have analytically linked bank capital regulation to management compensation 
and derive pricing of FDIC insurance premium that mitigate bank risk shifting incentives.  Along similar lines, see 
Kane (2001) on the motivation for regulators to impose incentive-based deferred compensation for CEO’s of deposit 
insured institutions.   3  
claim structure in banks to examine market-based monitoring forces.  Although bank holding 
companies are subject to similar regulation, we utilize confidential BOPEC rating data into our 
model to control for differences in regulatory oversight among bank holding companies.  In 
examining the sensitivity of our results to model specification, we allow CEO compensation, 
firm performance and corporate governance to be simultaneously determined.   
  Overall, we find evidence that the relative strength of the board of directors is positively 
associated with firm performance and negatively associated with executive compensation.  These 
results are consistent with a strong board providing a monitoring role within the corporate 
governance structure. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the main 
economic and strategic theories of executive compensation.  Statistics pertaining to CEO 
compensation and governance characteristics are presented in Section III.  Section IV presents 
the results on the determinants of top executive remuneration.  We summarize the main findings 
in section V.  
 
II.   Theories of Executive Remuneration  
A.   Principal-Agent Theory and Firm performance 
Economic theory of executive pay has focused on the design of optimal compensation schemes 
to align the interests of hired managers and shareholders.  Agency theory has identified several 
factors by which these interests may differ; including the level of effort exerted by the manager 
and problems resulting from the unobservabilty of the agent’s relevant skills.  The design of   4  
optimal compensation contracts essentially trades-off between different incentive problems and 
risk-sharing considerations.
3 
Research has also been directed to the identification of proper performance standards for 
evaluation and compensation.  The empirical literature has identified a strong linkage between 
accounting measures of return and top executive compensation (e.g., Lewellen and Huntsman, 
1970, Sloan, 1993 and Joskow and Rose, 1994).  Accordingly, our study will consider the 
accounting measure of return on assets (ROA) as a determinant of compensation.  We predict a 
positive relation between firm performance and total compensation. 
 
H1  Ceteris paribus, a positive association will exist between firm performance and CEO 
compensation. 
 
B. Managerial  Discretion  and Task Complexity 
In a parallel strand, recent studies in strategic management argue that managerial strategic 
discretion and the complexity of their job may be important determinants of CEO compensation.  
Managerial discretion is defined as task complexity and the latitude of options top managers 
have in making strategic choices.  Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) refer to managerial discretion as 
the extent to which an organization’s form and fate sit within the control of its top managers.  
Central to this concept is the idea that the greater the level of discretion, the greater the potential 
impact of actions taken by the CEO on the firm and, hence, on the ability to directly influence its 
performance. Thus, executive compensation is expected to be higher in high discretion contexts, 
which is in accord with agency theory insights on the use of subjective measures, given the 
difficulties outlined above to measure performance. 
  We measure management discretion by company size, growth, and outcome variability.  
Company size provides an indication of managerial responsibility and job complexity.  Ceteris 
                                                 
3 For a review of the incentives in firms, see Prendergast (1999) and Indjejikian (1999).   5  
paribus, the larger the size of the company, the greater is the manager’s discretion to influence 
the absolute value of shareholders wealth.
4  It is argued that it is more difficult to monitor 
management in larger firms (Smith and Watts, 1992, Eaton and Rosen, 1983, and Sloan, 1993). 
We predict a positive relation between firm size, proxied by the natural log of assets (ASSETS) 
and CEO compensation.  Another important measurement of managerial discretion is the growth 
of operations.  We use the firm ratio of market to book values (MKBK) as our proxy for 
potential future growth and predict MKBK will be positively associated with CEO 
compensation. 
High discretion also suggests a greater variability of outcomes.  As Finkelstein and Boyd 
point out: “When multiple courses of action are possible, uncertainty and complexity go up, and 
it becomes more difficult to predict firm performance with much accuracy.  High discretion 
contexts also tend to be inherently more risky because firms cannot easily rely on industry 
recipes or norms in their strategic direction” (1998, p. 181).  Hence uncertainty and job 
complexity go together.  We measure outcome variability as the standard deviation of ROA 
(σROA) measured over the preceding five years, and predict a positive association between our 
risk/outcome variability measure and CEO compensation. 
 
H2  Ceteris paribus, a positive association will exist between firm size and CEO 
compensation. 
 
H3  Ceteris paribus, a positive association will exist between firm growth/investment 
opportunity and CEO compensation. 
 
H4  Ceteris paribus, a positive association will exist between firm variability and CEO 
compensation. 
 
                                                 
4 Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) tournament theory offers another explanation that ties executive compensation to 
company size.    6  
In the banking industry, job complexity is also a function of the intensity of regulatory 
oversight.  CEOs facing more regulatory monitoring have typically less discretion in their 
strategic choices such as entering new businesses and types of products.  While the past few 
decades have seen a trend toward deregulation away from the Glass-Steagall Act, the banking 
sub-group of the 1990s still faced regulation concerning what services could be provided as will 
as ownership restrictions.
5  Empirical findings support the fact that CEOs of regulated firms are 
paid less than in unregulated ones (Joskow, Rose and Shepard, 1993).   
A unique feature of the banking industry is the regulator’s confidential rating system for 
bank-holding companies (referred to as the BOPEC), and we use the composite BOPEC rating as 
a measure of regulatory oversight.  The BOPEC composite rating is an assessment of a bank 
holding company’s financial performance.  To assess the overall financial condition of a bank 
holding company, regulators evaluate five aspects of holding company performance and 
soundness—“B” for the condition of banking subsidiaries, “O” for the condition of other 
nonbank subsidiaries, “P” for the condition of the parent company, “E” for the strength of 
holding company earnings, and “C” for the adequacy of holding company capital. A grade of 1 
(best) through 5 (worst) is assigned to the “B”, “O”, “P”, “E”, and “C.”
6  The composite 
performance evaluation, also on a 1 (best) through 5 (worst) scale, reflects supervisors’ overall 
assessment of a holding company’s safety and soundness.  Bank holding companies with a 
composite rating of 3, 4 or 5 are considered less than satisfactory and the regulator concludes 
that performance is flawed, managerial attention may be required to prevent further deterioration, 
or the institution is in need of immediate remedial attention.  A bank holding company that has a 
composite rating of 3, 4, or 5 is more likely to be subject to regulatory intervention; for example, 
                                                 
5 See Skeel (1999) and Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher (1999) for a discussion of regulation in the financial sector.   7  
the regulator may take action to suspend dividend payments or prevent acquisitions.  In contrast, 
bank holding companies with a composite BOPEC rating of 1 or 2 are “strong” or “satisfactory” 
and are less likely to have their operations constrained by the regulator.  In order to be consistent 
with the use of BOPEC classification in practice, we utilize a dummy variable set equal to one if 
BOPEC is in (1,2) or zero if BOPEC is in (3,4,5). We predict that CEO compensation will be 
negatively related to the degree of regulatory monitoring.  
H5  Ceteris paribus, a negative association will exist between firm regulatory monitoring and 
CEO compensation. 
 
In addition to regulatory monitoring, banks are also subject to market discipline from 
various debt-holders.
7  We created a measure of risk-priced funding (referred to as RPF) that 
includes subordinated debt, federal funds, and jumbo CDs.  All three of these claims are not 
insured deposits and, thus, potentially subject banks to market discipline.  Subordinated debt is 
long-term, unsecured debt and is not insured by the FDIC.  Federal funds are interbank loans that 
are uninsured and uncollateralized.  Jumbo CDs are CDs of $100,000 or more.  Jumbo CD 
holders have a greater incentive to monitor because any amount over $100,000 is not insured by 
the FDIC.  Since each of these claimants are more likely to face losses in the event of a bank 
failure, they are the more likely to monitor and discipline bank holding companies.  The 
empirical evidence suggests that each of these claimants exert discipline on large banks.  First, 
many studies clearly demonstrate that subordinated debtholders exert market discipline on banks 
(e.g., Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).  Second, studies support the notion 
that the federal funds market appears to exert a small amount of discipline on banks (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                               
6 For more detail see section 4070 of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Bank Holding Company Supervision 
Manual (as of June 2003). 
7 These debtholders, because they are subject to large losses in the event of bank insolvency, have incentives similar 
to the regulators with respect to bank monitoring.  The potential monitoring resulting from subordinated debtholders   8  
Furfine, 2001; King, 2003).  Finally, the empirical evidence also clearly supports the notion that 
uninsured depositors such as Jumbo CD holders discipline large banks (e.g., Ellis and Flannery, 
1992; Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001).  The ratio of risk-priced funding (i.e., the sum of 
jumbo CDs, federal funds and subordinated debt) to total assets is our measure of market 
discipline.    We predict that the larger the percentage of risk-priced funding in the bank’s capital 
structure, the more intense will be the market monitoring, leading to the following hypotheses.   
H6  Ceteris paribus, a negative association will exist between firm’s external market 
monitoring and CEO compensation. 
 
We should also point out that the concept of managerial discretion in strategy is closely 
related to the finance and accounting research on the link between investment opportunities and 
managerial marginal products.  CEOs in firms with larger investment opportunities are expected 
to have more skills and receive higher compensation.
8  
 
C.   CEO Variables  
We also account for two CEO specific factors.  First, managerial tenure may be a determinant of 
compensation.  This may be ambiguous though, as there are counteracting arguments on the 
relation between tenure and compensation.  In terms of information asymmetry, the passage of 
time on the job allows managers the opportunity to accumulate a track record thereby improving 
their bargaining power.  On the other hand, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) argue that long 
tenured CEOs may have a lower mobility, thereby lowering their bargaining power.   
Furthermore, “If the long-tenured CEO becomes very committed to established policies and 
                                                                                                                                                               
has spawned numerous regulatory proposals requiring banks to hold minimum levels of subordinated debt.  See, for 
example, the U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (SFRC 2000).  
8See Smith and Watts (1992), Bizjak, Brickley and Coles (1993), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Baber, Janakiraman and 
Kang (1996), and Mueller and Yun (1997) for further empirical evidence on the link between investment 
opportunities sets and compensation.   9  
strategies and gives little consideration to new directions, then the person’s worth to the 
organization is diminished… As long as the firm experiences ‘satisfactory’ experience, the 
executive will not be replaced… However the CEO’s pay may start resembling the figurehead 
role he or she may have evolved into” (p. 181).  From a corporate governance standpoint, the 
longer the CEOs serve in their positions, the more influence they may accumulate over the 
nomination of board members, thereby weakening the board independence.  Therefore, while we 
include the variable TENURE in our tests of executive compensation, we do not make any 
prediction as to the direction of the association. 
  Managerial stock ownership is probably the most intricate determinant of compensation.  
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) hypothesize that the relation between firm performance and 
the degree of managerial share ownership is non-monotonic and present evidence in support of 
their prediction.  At low levels managerial share ownership provides a better congruence of 
interest with outside shareholders.  As their share ownership increases, managers gain a tighter 
control and may engage in non-value maximizing activities.  However, at a higher ownership 
level, such activities have too high a personal cost and a closer realignment of objectives with 
outside shareholders is once again achieved.  Stoughton and Talmor (1998) argue that 
managerial initial ownership position fundamentally influences the optimal mechanism-design 
compensation schedule.  Depending on the relative bargaining power, they show that incentives 
provided by share ownership and option awards may act in opposite directions. 
Much of the prior literature includes only actual stock ownership to proxy for the 
incentive effects of equity ownership and ignores stock options (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker, 1999).  We follow the procedure outlined in Core and Guay (1998, 1999), where the 
sensitivity of the managers’ option portfolio to a percentage change in the underlying stock price   10  
can be estimated.  We combine the sensitivity of the manager’s option holdings to their stock 
holdings, including beneficial ownership.  We define the variable OWNER as the total combined 
(stock plus options) sensitivity to a 1% change in stock price. 
Prior empirical literature has found equity’s incentive alignment effect to dominate, 
leading to a negative relation between OWNER and manager compensation (e.g. Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999).  We predict a negative relation between OWNER and CEO 
compensation. 
H7  Ceteris paribus, a negative association will exist between CEO share ownership and CEO 
compensation. 
 
D.   Corporate Governance and External Ownership 
The need for corporate governance arises since managerial employment contracts cannot fully 
resolve the agency problems from the separation of ownership and control.  Incomplete state 
verification and prohibitive costs make it unrealistic for shareholders to map the firm strategic 
choices and other managerial actions, thereby disallowing a sole reliance on a pure contracting 
specification to align interests.  Of the different corporate governance mechanisms, “the board is 
the shareholders’ first line of defense against incompetent management” (Weisbach 1988, p. 
431).
9 
The implementation of board governance remains, however, a source of concern.  In 
practice, shareholders vote for the slate of directors proposed by management, the very CEO 
these directors are supposed to monitor (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).  Worse yet, the CEO 
usually has the veto power on the renewal or termination of a director’s service term on the 
board.  Consequently, directors are likely to feel obligated to the CEO both for the initial 
appointment and at his discretion for future renewals.  This led scholars to question whether   11  
directors can be effective monitors.  A counterargument, most forcefully expressed by Fama and 
Jensen (1983), is that directors’ concern for developing reputation as experts in decision controls, 
provides them with the incentive to ensure the well-running of the company.  This argument 
really applies to outside directors, as inside directors (i.e., other corporate officers on the board) 
are rarely in a position to challenge the CEO in the boardroom, and certainly are not expected to 
play a detrimental factor when setting the CEO compensation.  Outside directors, however, may 
be concerned with the company compensation structure in the interest of shareholders to solidify 
a reputation capital as competent board members.
10 
Critics of corporate governance suggest that placing a large number of insiders on the 
board is a mechanism to minimize board control.  Insiders are directors who are also officers of 
the firm.  Weisbach (1988) provides empirical evidence that supports the view that insider are 
detrimental to board independence.  He reports that CEOs of poorly performing firms are more 
likely to be removed in companies with outsider-dominated than insider-dominated boards.  The 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), in their Blue Ribbon Commission on 
director professionalism state, “Board independence is crucial to ensure that the board effectively 
carries out its mission and responsibilities, and fairly holds management accountable to 
shareholders.” (NACD 1996, p. 9).  The NACD goes on to recommend that boards require that 
independent directors fill the substantive majority of board seats.  In addition to being employed 
by the firm, relations that can compromise independence include director interlocks, and 
significant consulting or employment relations. 
                                                                                                                                                               
9  For a thorough perspective of the legal environment of the corporate governance of financial intermediaries, see 
Skeel (1999). 
10 Supporting evidence on the effective monitoring role of outside directors include Byrd and Hickman (1992) on the 
market reaction to tender offers, Weisbach (1988) on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, and 
Brickley, Coles, and Tory (1994) on the decision to adopt poison pills.  For the banking industry, Brickley and 
James (1987) report that the presence of outside directors tends to reduce management perquisites.   12  
We denote the variable INSIDE as the ratio of executive directors to the total number of 
directors.  Interlocked directors, denoted LOCK, is defined as inside directors who sit on the 
boards of outside director’s firms.  Board members who are not full-time employees but 
affiliated with the company in another way, denoted GRAY, includes such individuals as 
consultants, lawyers and investment bankers or others who have a business relationship with the 
firm, as well as directors with family ties to a company employee, usually the CEO (Weisbach 
1988).  Gray directors may be less independent than other outsider directors because of their 
family ties and business relations.
11  Each of these potential impairments of board independence, 
insiders, interlocked directors, and gray directors, are predicted to be associated with a lower 
level of monitoring and hence a higher level of CEO compensation. 
It is suggested that board effectiveness may depend on the director’s commitment and 
ability.  With regard to commitment, the NACD states, “Obviously, director professionalism 
requires a significant dedication of time.  In addition to limitations of the calendar, which restrict 
the amount of time for thinking, advising, and preparing for and attending meetings, there are 
limitations of the mind, which restrict the number of companies for which a director can 
maintain current knowledge.  As a result, the number of boards on which an individual can serve 
and meet the standard set forth herein is necessarily limited.” (NACD 1996, p. 11)  Since serving 
on four or more independent boards in not common, we have selected a threshold number of 
three boards to define a busy outside director (denoted BUSY). 
The NACD further favors “a strong director evaluation process to assure the board 
members retain the necessary energy, enthusiasm, commitment, and creativity to forestall 
habitual or simply reactive – and therefore less effective – director participation.” (NACD 1996, 
                                                 
11 We classify a gray director who holds a block of five or more percent of shares as an outside director.  Our 
reasoning is that a sizable ownership interest is more significant than considerations for past or affiliated business   13  
p. 13).  Among the NACD recommendations is a mandatory retirement age.  To test the effect of 
aging on board effectiveness we denote OLD as the number of outside directors over age 65. 
The CEO’s power base widens when the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board.  
This led Jensen (1993) and others to recommend that the function of board chair be separated 
from the CEO.  We define DUAL as a binary variable that indicates if a CEO duality exists.  
Board size may also be related to board effectiveness (Jensen 1993, Yermack 1996).  Jensen 
(1993) argues for smaller boards in a view he refers to as overcrowding of the board.  This 
attitude concerning the relative lower effectiveness of large board is also commonly expressed in 
the popular press.  We define the total number of board members as TOTAL. 
As with the potential impairments of board independence, each of the potential 
impairments to board effectiveness, BUSY, OLD, DUAL, and TOTAL, are predicted to be 
associated with a lower level of monitoring and a higher level of CEO compensation.
12 
Because the degree of board strength can result from a large number of factors, we create 
an overall measure of board strength from a composite of these seven individual board 
characteristics.
13  Our procedure for the construction of the board strength variable (BOARD) 
appears in the appendix.  BOARD is constructed such that a higher value represents a potentially 
more independent and effective board and therefore a theoretically stronger board. 
H8  Ceteris paribus, a negative association will exist between Board strength and CEO 
compensation. 
 
E.    Summary 
                                                                                                                                                               
relations. We do not, however, apply this rule to family directors. 
12 Fama and Jensen (1983) provide a counter-argument regarding busy board members when they argue that outside 
board members who hold multiple directorships have greater incentives to monitor corporate decisions because of 
their reputation capital as decision experts.  In addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) provide a counter-argument 
with regard to total board size when they argue that corporate boards have a variety of responsibilities in addition to 
monitoring management.  Hence, a larger board may offer a more diverse set of talents to deal with these 
responsibilities, thereby increasing the board’s overall effectiveness   14  
Four strands of considerations have been discussed for influencing the design of executive 
compensation: principal-agent theory, managerial discretion, CEO characteristics, and corporate 
governance.  In this paper we explore the predictions of these theories with respect to CEO 
compensation.  It should be stressed that the predictions of the theories above are not 
independent.  As is pointed out, managerial discretion is related to economic-based research on 
the link between compensation and the investment opportunities set.  Agency theory is also 
weaved into other considerations such as corporate governance.  As for the specific variables, a 
few such as CEO stock ownership may be identified with more than one theory.  Table 1 
provides a summary list of the explanatory variables we use in subsequent regression analysis, 
along with their predicted effect on compensation. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
III.   Compensation and Governance Practices in Financial Institutions 
The data for the study includes all the 76 bank holding companies for which executive 
compensation data is available in Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database.  The study uses 
data for the years 1992-1997. 
  The ExecuComp database includes all the compensation items from the annual proxy 
statement (Schedule 14a).  It lists separately all major forms of cash compensation: salary, 
bonus, payout from long-term incentive plans, and other annual compensation (such as 
perquisites, payments to cover taxes, etc.).  It also includes disclosed information regarding 
stock-based compensation: restricted stock awards, stock options grants and stock appreciation 
                                                                                                                                                               
13 Examples of studies that have created aggregate measures of board strength include Bushman, Chen, Engel and   15  
rights.
14  We gathered data on board memberships directly from Schedule 14a.  Regulatory 
ratings were obtained directly from the Federal Reserve.  Company financials are obtained from 
Standard and Poor's Compustat. 
We note that compensation reported in the ExecuComp database for executives who 
served as CEOs for part of a year is not distinguished from those who served a full year and is 
thus distorted.  Clearly, if a CEO was appointed in October, the disclosed compensation is 
seriously biased downward.  On the other hand, turnovers are occasionally associated with 
upward biases since the compensation at that time may include unusual items (such as golden 
parachutes) of extraordinary magnitude.  We identify all cases of CEO succession and remove 
the company year from our sample data.  Tables 2 and 3 displays compensation and governance 
summary statistics for our sample firms.  For comparison purposes we have also included 
summary statistics for the 728 manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999) and 176 (non-financial) service 
companies (SIC 7000-8999) in the database (as before, observations pertaining to turnover years 
are removed).  All figures are cross-sectionally pooled across the period 1992–1997, thus 
representing aggregate statistics for the entire period.  
Panels A and B of Table 2 report summary statistics for the components of CEO 
compensation.  Both the salary and bonus compensation are larger, on average, in the financial 
sector relative to the other sectors.  A direct comparison, however, may be misleading in view of 
the average size difference between companies of the three sectors.  In terms of the percentage 
mix of pay, the breakdown between cash CEO compensation (salary, bonus and long-term 
incentive plan payouts (LTIP)) vs. stock-based compensation (options and restricted stock) is 
about the same for the financial and non-financial sectors.  However, in terms of the individual 
                                                                                                                                                               
Smith (1999) and Milliron (2000).   16  
components, financial companies rely more heavily on bonus pay, LTIP and restricted stocks and 
less on base salary or stock options. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
  
  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of governance variables.  For our sample of bank 
holding companies, board size averages about 16, with an average of just over two of these 
members insiders.  In almost all cases, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. 
   
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
IV.  Analysis of CEO compensation determinants 
 
  Theoretical work has argued that compensation policy is not determined separately from 
firm performance, and firm governance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998).  Instead, these relations may be simultaneously determined.  Several empirical studies 
have provided evidence of the endogeneity of these relations (Boschen and Smith, 1995, and 
Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran, 2000). 
  We model a system of simultaneous equations that incorporates the relations between 
CEO compensation, firm performance, and board strength.  Our system recognizes three 
endogenous variables, PAY, ROA, and BOARD, along with the remaining explanatory variables 
appearing in Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of the regression sample are in Table 4. We employ a 
                                                                                                                                                               
14 Option grants and restricted share ownership data are adjusted for stock splits occurring during the sample period.  
The value of stock options granted is based on Black-Scholes valuation.   17  
three-stage least squares estimation in order to increase the efficiency of our estimation by taking 
cross-equation correlations into account.
15 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
  Table 5 provides the results for our estimation of the three simultaneous equations.  In 
order to lessen the effect of scale differences, we transform CEO compensation (PAY) to a 
natural log and use the transformed variable as the dependent variable (Barro and Barro, 1990, 
Sloan, 1993).  With respect to the first equation, PAY, we note CEO compensation is 
significantly associated with the accounting measure of firm performance, (ROA).  This result is 
consistent with the literature, which has typically identified a strong linkage between accounting 
measures of return to top executive pay.  Second, all three of the measures of managerial 
discretion and job complexity are significant.  Consistent with the previous literature, company 
size, measured by the natural log of assets (ASSETS) has a strong positive effect on executive 
pay (e.g., Ciscel and Carroll, 1980, Leonard, 1990, Schaefer, 1998, and Baker and Hall, 1998).  
Our proxy for future growth, MKBK, is also highly significant.  This is consistent with the Smith 
and Watts (1992) finding, where they interpret MKBK as a measure of the firm’s growth 
options.  They argue that managers’ expertise provides more value added for firms with greater 
growth opportunities.  Finally, σROA is statistically significant and in the predicted direction.  
This supports our prediction, and is consistent with theory that based on risk sharing higher 
volatility should be associated with a higher level of compensation. 
                                                 
15 A possible concern with three-stage least squares is the hazard of a mis-specification appearing throughout the 
system.  We ran two-stage least squares and had qualitatively similar results.  A concern when interpreting output 
from regressions is the potential impact of influential observations.  We first test for influential points by using 
Cook’s D statistic.  We remove seven observations from the sample based on comparing the Cook’s D value to an F 
distribution.   18  
Neither of our two CEO specific variables proved statistically significant.  Likewise, 
neither the external market monitoring of the risk-based funding, nor the regulatory monitoring 
proved to be a significant determinant of variability in CEO compensation.   
  Next, we consider the corporate governance variable BOARD.  Recall that Board is a 
composite variable computed from seven individual variables proxying for board independence 
and efficiency.  BOARD displays a significantly negative relation to CEO compensation.  Thus 
stronger boards are associated with lower compensation after controlling for economic and 
regulatory determinants.  This negative sign on BOARD can be interpreted as evidence that the 
board of directors plays an important role in monitoring and rewarding the CEO. 
The results for the ROA regression provide some evidence that there is a simultaneous 
relation between performance and the structure of compensation, and also between firm 
performance and the board of directors.  After controlling for other determinants, there exists a 
statistically positive relation between CEO compensation and performance and between board 
strength and performance.  For our sample, a higher percentage of compensation is associated 
with better performance as is a stronger board.   
The final column contains the results of the BOARD regression.  After controlling for 
other determinants, we note a negative association between board strength and CEO 
compensation.  This is consistent with our prior finding that stronger boards are associated with 
lower levels of compensation (a monitoring function).  Consistent with the prior column, we also 
note a positive association between firm performance and board strength.  One somewhat 
surprising result is the negative association between regulatory oversight, worse BOPEC ratings, 
and board strength. This may be mean that either the regulator inspires some changes in control 
as a result of problems at the bank or that stronger boards are used to compensate for other   19  
factors that create problems at the bank and simultaneously cause it to have a poor BOPEC 
rating. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
V. Summary 
Four major strands have evolved within the executive compensation literature.  In this paper we 
perform a comprehensive study of executive compensation determinants by providing a unifying 
analysis of these strands: principle-agency theory, managerial discretion, external ownership and 
corporate governance, and CEO specific characteristics.  We examine financial sector data, 
which provides a relatively homogeneous setting.  Using data from the period 1992-1997, we 
first examine 15 individual variables (seven of these are combined in the BOARD variable), 
drawn from the four major classes of variables to analyze executive compensation in the banking 
industry.   
  We first look at the determinants of CEO compensation.  The higher levels firm 
performance, ROA, appear to be positively associated with higher pay.  For our sample of firms, 
larger firms with future growth potential and greater variability in firm performance pay their 
CEOs more.  Finally, the Board of Directors appears to play a monitoring role.  Potentially 
stronger boards are associated with lower CEO compensation.  Also, there is a positive 
association between firm performance and board strength. 
Due to the need for hand collecting many of our governance variables, our study was 
limited only to one industry. While the exclusive use of bank holding companies is potentially a 
limitation, it has also potential strengths.  Firstly, as noted above, the use of a single industry   20  
affords us a manageable sample.  With this sample we are able to gather the necessary data to 
provide a unified test encompassing theory and associated variables from many separate studies 
that looked at individual aspects of the executive compensation question.  Using a single industry 
also provides a sample of firms with relatively homogeneous operational characteristics, thus 
offering a reasonable control of unspecified factors.  We are also able to exploit some unique 
characteristics of bank-holding companies in order enhance our tested model.  In particular we 
included variables that capture both regulatory oversight and also external market monitoring 
from debtholders.  In addition, we do not know of any a priori reasons why this industry should 
differ from the general population of firms with regard to executive pay.   
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Appendix A: Constructing a composite board strength variable. 
The variable (BOARD) represents a composite variable measuring overall board strength.  
We give equal weight to each characteristic in the overall BOARD measure; however we also 
recognize the substitutability of measures within the board.  We accomplish this through the 
following procedure: 
1.  Create a variable called INDEPENDENCE by summing the two mutually exclusive 
percentage variables INSIDE and GRAY. 
2.  Partition the sample observations into quartiles based on INDEPENDENCE and assign a 
score of 1 to observations in the top quartile, a score of 0 to observations in the middle 
two quartiles, and a score of –1 to observations in the bottom quartile.  Higher scores 
represent greater board independence and therefore a theoretically stronger board.  Using 
the same strategy, the observations are partitioned on LOCK. 
3.  Since the four remaining effectiveness measures are not mutually exclusive and are not 
of the same units, we cannot simply sum them to together.  Instead, we again partition 
the observations into quartiles based on each of the four effectiveness measures.  As in 
step two, we assign scores based on quartile, with a score of 1 to the upper quartile and –
1 to the bottom quartile.  Higher numbers represent greater effectiveness and therefore a 
theoretically stronger board. 
4.  Finally, we add together the score for both the independence variables and the 
effectiveness variables to create an overall board strength measure.  To recognize that 
these individual characteristics may be substitutes, we again partition the observations, 
this time based on the computed strength score.  We assign a score of 1 to observations 
in the top quartile, a score of 0 to observations in the middle two quartiles, and a score of 
–1 to observations in the bottom quartile where the positive value represents a 
theoretically stronger board. 
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Table 1 
 
Variable definitions and predicted effect on executive compensation. 
Variable  Acronym  Definition  Predicted effect on 
executive 
compensation 
Return on assets  ROA  Net income divided by average total 
assets 
+ 
Natural log of assets  ASSETS  The natural log of total assets  + 
Standard deviation of 
ROA 
σ(ROA)  Standard deviation of return on assets 
over trailing five years 
+ 
Market to Book  MKBK  The ratio of the market value of 
equity to the book value of equity 
+ 
CEO tenure  TENURE  Number of years as CEO  + 
Sensitivity of CEO 
equity 
OWNER  Sensitivity of CEO stock and option 




Regulator rating  BOPEC  The BOPEC rating for Bank holding 




Risk-priced funding  RPF  The proportion of risk-priced funding 
(jumbo CDs, federal funds, and 
subordinated debt) to total assets 
- 
Board Strength  BOARD  A composite board strength variable 
made up of the below seven 
variables.  BOARD is constructed 
such that a larger value represents a 




Compensation  PAY  Salary, other annual, annual bonus, LTIP, restricted stock 
granted, and stock options granted   27  
Table 2 
Descriptive compensation statistics based on 1992-1997 data for 76 bank holding companies, 
176 non-financial service firms and 728 manufacturers. 
 
Panel A:  Components of CEO Compensation 
 Bank  Holding 
Companies 
Manufacturing Services 
  Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median 
Salary (000$)  846.99  786.64  631.05  550.00  550.8  459.55 
Bonus (000$)  933.79  501.44  514.41  338.35  565.5  231.00 
LTIP  (000$)  229.20 0.00  163.03 0.00  52.65  0.00 
Restricted Stock (000$)  381.41  0.00  157.85  0.00  202.19  0.00 
Options (000$)  1,099 566.40  1,122 386.85  1,915 348.61 
Total 3,490   2,588   3,286  
 
Panel B:  Compensation Percentages 
 Bank  Holding 
Companies 
Manufacturing Services 
Salary 36.02  40.76  41.09 
Bonus 26.52  22.30  20.33 
LTIP 5.79  3.73  1.49 
Restricted Stock  7.07  4.02  3.78 
Options 24.60 29.19 33.31 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Variable definitions: 
Banks  Bank Holding Companies defined as firms with SIC from 6000-
6099 and FR Y9-C filers (regulatory report form of the Federal 
Reserve System). 
Manufacturing Manufacturing  defined  as firms with SIC from 2000-3999 
Services  Services defined as firms with SIC from 7000-8999 
Salary  Salary and other annual compensation 
Bonus Annual  bonus 
LTIP  Long-term Incentive Plan payouts 
Restricted Stock  Value of restricted stock granted 
Options  Black-Scholes aggregate value of stock options granted  
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Table 3   
Descriptive statistics on corporate governance characteristics based on data for 1992-1997. 
 
 Mean  Median 
DUAL (%)  90.33 100.00 
Total Board Members 
(TOTAL) 
15.79 16.00 
Insiders (INSIDE) (% 
of Total) 
15.58 13.33 
Gray (GRAY) (% of 
Total) 
4.53      0.00 
Busy (BUSY) (% of 
Total) 
46.11 50.00 
Old (OLD) (% of 
Total) 
23.76 21.05 
Interlock (LOCK) (% 
of Total) 










Distribution of Composite BOPEC Rating 
Regulator rating 
(BOPEC) from 
1(best) to 5 (worst) 
1  2 3 4 5 
Percent of 
Sample 
48.1 48.4 1.95  1.56  0.0   29  
Table 4 
 
Descriptive statistics for the regression sample.  The sample contains 240 firm-year observations. 
                     
                     
 Mean   
Std. 
Dev.   Min   Q1   Median   Q3    Max 
ROA 1.16   0.45   -1.96   0.95  1.18   1.37    2.85
PAY 7.97   0.76   6.30   7.40  7.90   8.53    10.00
ASSETS 12.21    3.11   7.85   9.97  11.08   15.35    19.53
σ(ROA)  0.29   0.29   0.01   0.10   0.20   0.36   1.49
MKBK 2.11   0.96   0.78   1.46  1.84   2.48    6.95
TENURE 7.29   4.97   0.99   3.17  6.00   10.59    22.01
OWNER 360.32    1,298.94   0.26   69.62  129.18   272.00    18,664.47
RPF 8.15   5.51   0.00   4.70  6.58   9.45    30.29
BOPEC  0.96      —     —   —   —   —      —
BOARD  -0.15      —     —   —   —   —      —
                                     
                     
Variable Acronym  Definition 
Return on assets  ROA  Net income divided by average total assets 
Compensation  PAY  Salary, other annual, annual bonus, LTIP, restricted stock granted, and stock 
options granted 
Natural log of 
assets 
ASSETS  The natural log of total assets 
Standard 
deviation of ROA 
σ(ROA)  Standard deviation of return on assets over trailing five years 
Market to Book  MKBK  The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity 
CEO tenure  TENURE  Number of years as CEO 
Sensitivity of 
CEO equity 
OWNER  Sensitivity of CEO stock and option holding to a 1% change in stock price. 
Risk-priced 
funding 
RPF  The proportion of risk-priced funding (jumbo CDs, federal funds, and 
subordinated debt) to total assets 
Regulator rating  BOPEC  The BOPEC rating for Bank holding companies as determined by the federal 
regulators 
Board Strength  BOARD  A composite variable made up of seven variables that equals negative one if 
the score is in the bottom quartile, zero if it’s in the two middle quartiles and 
one if it is in the top quartile.  BOARD is constructed such that a larger value 
represents a theoretically stronger Board 
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Table 5 
 
Determinants of CEO compensation for Bank Holding Companies; simultaneous estimation using three-
stage least squares.  Data from 1992 to 1997; t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Independent 






























































N 240     
 
** Significant at the 1% level, one-tailed 
  * Significant at the 5% level, one-tailed 
 
 